

RESILIENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL SECURITY



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INTRODUCTION

The National Security System came into being with the approval of Act 36/2015 of 28 September, on National Security, which referred to the capacity for resistance and recovery, which is nothing other than the capacity for resilience.

However, this was not the first time that resilience was mentioned in the sphere of national security. Even before the approval of said Act and the introduction of the concept of national security into our legal system, Spain's 2011 Security Strategy and subsequent 2013 National Security Strategy referenced the capacity for resistance and recovery.

Having featured in successive National Security Strategies it was inevitable that resilience would find its way into second-level strategies, which are those that enter into greater detail on specific aspects of national security.



This document aims to catalogue and highlight the value of all the actions of the central administration aimed at strengthening resilience within the National Security System, endeavouring to do so from a political and strategic vantage point.

This is why, after briefly summarizing, in Chapter 1, the legislative basis of the national strategies in which resilience is included, we will go on to provide a detailed list, in Chapter 2, of the actions being carried out in this sphere in the European Union, due to its strong legislative influence on all its Member States, in NATO, as the international security and defence organization of greatest relevance to Spain, and in other international organizations.

Subsequently, in Chapter 3 we will map out the initiatives underway to build resilience in response to the 16 risks and threats to national security identified in the 2021 National Security Strategy, currently in force.

Finally, Chapter 4 summarizes those measures implemented with a view to strengthening national resilience which, while not included among those adopted to respond to the risks and threats considered in the Strategy, nevertheless have their place within the National Security System as cross-cutting measures with direct implications for the well-being of citizens.

The Department of National Security is grateful for the collaboration of all the ministries that participated in drafting this document, which highlights that Spain was one of the first States to incorporate the now widely recognized concept of resilience into its strategies.



RESILIENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL SECURITY



CHAPTER 1

The political and strategic perspective of resilience in national security

Despite having been globally popularized by the world of English-speaking academia, “resilience” has its etymological origins in the Latin term “resiliere”, which refers to the act of leaping backwards, bouncing or recoiling.

However, the current meaning of resilience does not mean to pull back or retreat but quite the opposite; rather, it refers to having the necessary flexibility to resist and recover. In fact, the current meaning could be defined more exactly as having the capacity to adapt when faced with a disruptive agent, even to the point of bouncing back stronger than ever after such a confrontation.

Spain included the concept of resilience in its strategies before the National Security System even came into existence, and was one of the first States in the region to do so.

Resilience and Strategy

From the point of view of National Security, resilience appears in Spain in the [Spanish Security Strategy 2011](#), although as “**capacity for resistance and recovery**”, being one of the six basic concepts that the Strategy intended to promote..

In a similar vein, the [2013 National Security Strategy](#) defined **resilience**, or the capacity to resist and recover, as one of its underlying principles, making reference to the capacity of both human and material resources.

With the approval of [Act 36/2015 of 28 September, on National Security](#), the capacity to resist and recover (**resilience**) became one of the fundamental principles guiding Spain’s national security policy.

This is why, one of the general objectives of the [2017 National Security Strategy](#) was to foster “the resilience of **society and of the public administrations**”. Resilience is also referred to expressly in some of the national security lines of action, including Cybersecurity (**resilience** in (1) the Public Sector, (2) strategic sectors (especially key infrastructure and basic services), (3) the business sector; and (4) the general population), and the Protection of Critical infrastructure (“Increase the capacities and **resilience** of the systems linked to critical infrastructure”).

On the initiative of the President of the Government, and due to the need to adapt the previous strategy, the [2021 National Security Strategy](#) was published on 31 December 2021.

Resilience is identified in the 2021 Strategy as one of three keys to achieving a more efficient National Security System, through a comprehensive approach that takes into account all public authorities and all members of society, and that guarantees the capacity for resistance, transformation and recovery in the face of national security crises.

This is why it is essential to strengthen environmental and ecological resilience, cyberresilience, economic and supply chain resilience, and the resilience of society and of the State, as a whole, in the face of the entire spectrum of risks and threats to national security.

On the basis of this understanding, the National Security Council amended the duties of the Situation Committee¹, the only body providing crisis management support in the framework of the National Security System, entrusting it with the task of proposing instruments to the Council that would enable it to coordinate actions to strengthen **resilience** in national security. This led to the creation of a Standing Group for the Coordination of National Resilience actions.

¹[Order of Ministry of the Presidency of the Government, Parliamentary Relations and Democratic Memory 714/2022 of 23 July, publishing the Decision of the National Security Council of 21 June 2022, amending that of 1 December 2017, regulating the Situation Committee.](#)

Resilience in sectoral strategies

In addition to top-level strategic and political documents, which are eminently cross-cutting in nature, the Administration has been working for several years to strengthen resilience at a sectoral level.

In fact, as a result of the 2013 National Security Strategy, second-level strategies began to adopt the concept of resilience.

Thus, the [2013 National Cybersecurity Strategy](#) made various references to the **resilience** of the information and communications technologies (ICT) systems of the public and private sectors. And, subsequently, the [2019 National Cybersecurity Strategy](#) identified the “security and **resilience of information and communications networks and systems** for the public sector and essential services” as its first objective.

Resilience was then later included in the [2019 National Civil Protection Strategy](#), which placed particular emphasis on social and community resilience.

The [Procedure for action against disinformation](#), approved by the National Security Council in October 2020, determines that freedom of expression and the freedom and plurality of the media, among other rights, constitute the foundation of **social resilience** in the face of challenges.

In the military sphere, the [2020 Defence Policy Directive](#) calls for “a more reasonable degree of strategic self-sufficiency and national resilience”, while the [Concept of Employment for the Armed Forces 2021](#) advocates “strengthening the **resilience** and response capacity of all of the nation’s essential organizations”.

With regard to the fight against terrorism, [Order of the Presidency of the Government, Parliamentary Relations and Democratic Memory 219/2020 of 13 March, on the publication of the National Security Council’s Decision to create and regulate the Specialist Counter-Terrorism Committee](#) refers to: “The need to tackle horizontal issues such as the prevention of radicalization, especially in its educational and social aspects, in a comprehensive and cooperative manner, to promote **resilience** in the face of terrorist attacks and to generate counter-narratives to challenge fallacious terrorist narratives”.

Moreover, the 2023 National Counter-Terrorism Strategy includes **resilience** among its principles as the capacity to resist and to recover from terrorist actions. In addition, it will contain a chapter entitled “Spain: Safe from Terrorism and Resilient to It”. This Strategy also stresses the importance of fostering effective and proactive strategic communication that allows all stakeholders to respond to acts committed by terrorists or violent extremists, and to counter their propaganda, thereby reducing their consequences and increasing the **resilience of the population and institutions affected**, promoting the collaboration and involvement of social media.

In the sphere of maritime security, the new Maritime Security Strategy applies the principle of **more resilience** to ports, maritime infrastructure and economic activities dependent on the coast, as well as to the energy supply lines and telecommunications cables laid on the seabed.

The [National Strategy against Organized Crime and Serious Crime](#) also takes **resilience** into account, defining it as one of its principles together with unity of action, preparedness and efficiency.

In the economic sphere, the State Secretariat for Trade published the [Action Plan for Internationalizing the Spanish Economy \(2021-2022\)](#), which includes “increasing the **resilience** of our external sector” as one of its main lines of action.

More recently, [Act 7/2021 of 20 May, on Climate Change and Energy Transition](#) establishes a framework that has served as the basis for the creation of a number of different strategic planning instruments, including, from the energy perspective at least, the [National Climate Change Adaptation Plan \(Spanish acronym: PNACC\)](#) promoting **resilience and adaptation to climate change**, the [Long-Term Decarbonization Strategy](#), the [Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan \(Spanish acronym: PNIEC\)](#), the [Just Transition Strategy](#) and the [Energy Poverty Strategy](#).

In addition, the strategic guidelines on water and climate change approved in July 2022 (the executive summary of which can be found [here](#)), constitute the document provided for in the Climate Change Act to establish guidelines and measures for water planning and management that increase **resilience-country** in the face of global warming with a time-line looking to 2030.

In the sphere of food production, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was conceived in 1962 with the main aim of ensuring the **resilience of the agricultural production sector**.

The agreement on the latest reform of the CAP was adopted in December 2021. This CAP will apply from 2023 to 2027, and one of its General Objectives is to “foster a smart, competitive, **resilient** and diversified agricultural sector ensuring long-term food security”. In Spain, the reform was followed by the [CAP Strategic Plan for 2023-2027](#).

Moreover, extensive legislation has been approved on animal health ([Act 8/2003 of 24 April, on Animal Health](#)) and plant health ([Act 43/2002 of 20 November, on Plant Health](#)).

Remaining in the agricultural sphere, agricultural insurance was adopted as national policy for the purpose of furnishing this sector with greater capacity for **resilience**, due to our country’s specific bioclimatic characteristics. State support for farming, which is exposed to risks which the farmers are not able to control, is coordinated through the Combined Agricultural Insurance System (Spanish acronym: SSAC).

Advances have also been made with respect to the resilience of transport systems. The Strategy of the National Civil Aviation Security Committee (Spanish acronym: CNSAC) for addressing the threat represented by drones is notable in this regard.

The National Recovery, Transformation and Resilience Plan

Looking beyond the sphere of national security, in the wake of the Covid-19 crisis, and with a view to complying with the [NextGenerationEU Recovery Plan for Europe](#), the Government of Spain approved the [National Recovery, Transformation and Resilience Plan](#) in June 2021. The objectives of this Plan include strengthening **resilience in the healthcare, economic, social and institutional spheres and increasing crisis preparedness**.

The Recovery Plan seeks to strengthen **economic, social, territorial and environmental resilience** with the aim of reducing the vulnerability of the Spanish economy and of strengthening its capacity for adaptation in the healthcare, institutional, economic and social spheres in response to future shocks of different natures.

Furthermore, it includes actions to buttress resilience in the face of climate-related and environmental risks and threats.



CHAPTER 2

Resilience at International Organizations

Although States have exclusive competence over national security, there is no doubt that the more resilient each member of an organization, the more resilient the organization as a whole.

Therefore, international organizations for integration, such as the European Union (EU), and for cooperation, such as NATO, encourage their members to be more resilient in the aim of achieving a more robust common resilience.

Resilience in the EU

In the context of the EU, resilience features in the [2016 Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy](#) as one of the five principles which should guide the European Union's external action, which promotes **resilience** in the EU's neighbouring and partner countries, in order to prevent conflicts and crises.

Consequently, A New Strategic Agenda 2019–2024, in its Protecting citizens and freedoms section, states: “We will increase the EU's resilience against both natural and man-made disasters.”

The [2020 Strategic Foresight Report](#), published by the European Commission under the title Strategic Foresight – Charting the Course towards a More Resilient Europe, views **resilience** as a new compass for EU policies.

The report analyses **resilience** across four interrelated dimensions (**social and economic, geopolitical, green, and digital**) and explains its importance to achieving our long-term strategic goals in the contexts of the fair, green and digital transitions.

In this context, the EU is working to improve its preparedness, response capability and resilience in the face of future crises.

Indeed, the conclusions adopted by the European Council on 24-25 June 2021 (Section I. Covid-19, item 5) state that: “The European Council discussed the initial lessons that can be learned from the pandemic on the basis of the report by the Commission. It invites the incoming Presidency to take work forward in the Council to enhance our **collective preparedness, response capability and resilience to future crises** and to protect the functioning of the internal market.”

The aforementioned conclusions led to the adoption of the Council conclusions on enhancing preparedness, response capability and resilience to future crises, which focus exclusively on these matters. It should be noted that, shortly afterwards, according to items seven, eight and nine of Section II. Crisis management and resilience of the Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 16 December 2021, the European Council “welcomes the Council conclusions of 23 November 2021”, and stresses that “work to enhance our collective preparedness, response capability and resilience to future crises [...] is a major cross-cutting political priority for the Union.” Moreover, it calls for strengthening the EU's crisis response and preparedness in an all-hazards approach. It also urges for “building and monitoring **resilience** and addressing areas where we are exposed”. The Council was invited to take work forward and review progress regularly.

On 21 March 2022 the Council approved the document [A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence - For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security](#), which refers to strengthening the EU's resilience as a

way of “better anticipating, detecting and responding to [such] threats” and “bolster[ing] our societal and economic resilience, protect[ing] critical infrastructure, as well as our democracies and EU and national electoral processes”. It concludes that: “We must be more **resilient** against hybrid threats, cyberattacks and climate-related risks, natural disasters and pandemics”.

[Directive \(EU\) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC](#) was adopted to this purpose. Its aim is to “reduce the vulnerabilities and strengthen the resilience of critical entities”, in sectors such as energy, transport, health, drinking water, waste water and space. Some provisions also refer to certain public administration entities.

A national strategy to **increase the resilience of critical entities**, carry out a risk assessment at least every four years and determine which critical entities provide essential services will therefore be an obligation for all Member States.

In addition, Commission Recommendation of 8 February 2023 on Union disaster resilience goals (2023/C 56/01) was issued for the purpose of improving the efficiency of prevention of, preparedness for and response to natural or man-made disasters in the European Civil Protection Mechanism. This Recommendation states the EU’s disaster resilience goals: (a) anticipate - improving risk assessment, anticipation and disaster risk management planning; (b) prepare - increasing risk awareness and preparedness of the population; (c) alert - enhancing early warning; (d) respond - enhancing the Union Mechanism response capacity; (e) secure - ensuring a robust Civil Protection System.

In the sphere of organized crime, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) issues the [Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment](#) (SOCTA). The goal of this report is to assess and analyse the main threats relating to organized crime in the EU, and to provide useful information so that the authorities may take effective measures to combat these threats. The SOCTA 2021 highlights the need to **strengthen** Member States’ **resilience in the face of the threat posed by organized crime** in the long term by investing in training and capacity building for police and court staff, improving cross-border cooperation and promoting technological innovation.

In matters of maritime security, in October 2023, the Council of the European Union approved a revision of the European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and a new Action Plan, which aims to improve governance and the rule of law at sea. The new EUMSS closely follows the principles set out in the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence to ensure the free movement of goods and freedom of navigation, while also protecting the biodiversity and sustainability of the seas.

As regards cyberresilience, on 15 September 2022 the European Commission submitted a proposal for a regulation on cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements (known as the Cyber Resilience Act or CRA). This proposal aims to strengthen the regulation of cybersecurity to guarantee safer hardware and software products.

Moreover, in December 2022, Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (known as the NIS 2 Directive) was issued. This Directive aims to achieve a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union and specifies that it cannot be achieved without considering the **cyberresilience** of all Member States.

As regards climate change, the European Union has legislated to increase its adaptation capabilities, strengthen **resilience** and reduce vulnerability to climate change by means of [Regulation \(EU\) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations \(EC\) No 401/2009 and \(EU\) 2018/1999 \('European Climate Law'\)](#) and [Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Forging a climate-resilient Europe - the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change](#).

With respect to food security, the European Food Security Crisis preparedness and response Mechanism (EFSCM) is responsible for giving a common European response to crises affecting food, in order to guarantee food security. The Commission aims to assess the **resilience** of the system and draft a contingency plan to be activated in crisis situations. Moreover, there is extensive legislation on animal and plant health.

Regarding health matters, on 6 December 2022 Regulation (EU) 2022/2371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 November 2022 on serious cross-border threats to health was issued. This regulation includes Articles on preparedness and response planning, including **resilience capabilities in the health sector**, as well as developing the EU's surveillance capabilities.

To contribute to all of the EU's work on resilience, in September 2023 the Spanish Presidency presented [Resilient EU2030](#), a strategic proposal that identifies **nine lines of action** to strengthen the EU's resilience and global competitiveness in the **energy, digital technology, health, and food sectors**.

Resilience at NATO

Resilience, albeit considered a national responsibility by NATO Allies, is for NATO a collective commitment rooted in Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty and an essential element of NATO's "three core tasks": deterrence and defence; crisis prevention and management; and cooperative security. Every NATO Ally's commitment to maintaining and strengthening their resilience contributes to reducing NATO's vulnerability as a whole.

Several working documents and lines of action have highlighted the significance of resilience and, especially, of civil preparedness as a critical factor for the collective defence of the Alliance and the support of Allied military forces in any location within the area of responsibility of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) at all times.

The main instrument for assessing the resilience of NATO Allies follows the "Seven Baseline Requirements for national resilience" agreed at the Warsaw Summit in 2016:

- assured continuity of government and critical government services;
- resilient energy supplies;
- ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people;
- resilient food and water resources;
- ability to deal with mass casualties;
- resilient civil communications systems;
- resilient civil transportation systems.

These criteria go beyond their military or civil protection components, and require the authorities to carry out a multi-sector analysis based on a holistic approach.

The NATO 2030 agenda, agreed at the 2021 Brussels Summit, states: **"resilience is our first line of defence"** and introduces three resilience commitments for NATO Allies:

- The establishment of national resilience goals and corresponding implementation plans.
- The establishment of a new Resilience Committee at the heart of NATO, which meets regularly through representatives from the delegations and, at least once a year, at the Policy Director level.
- The designation of a Senior National Representative for Resilience responsible for coordination of and accountability for national resilience efforts.

Finally, the [NATO 2022 Strategic Concept](#)² approved at the NATO Summit in Madrid in 2022, refers expressly to **resilience** in the following terms:

“We will pursue a more robust, integrated and coherent approach to building national and Alliance-wide resilience against military and non-military threats and challenges to our security, as a national responsibility and a collective commitment rooted in Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty.”

From the perspective of security and relations between NATO and the EU, on 29 June 2023 the two organizations presented the Final Assessment Report drafted by the EU-NATO Task Force on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure.

Finally, at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Vilnius on 11 July 2023, the **2023 Alliance Resilience Objectives** were agreed.

² The Strategic Concept is the Alliance’s second most important document after the Washington Treaty. The Strategic Concept identifies the core elements of the security environment facing the Alliance, provides a guide for adapting the Allied response thereto and outlines NATO’s nature and its goals for the next decade.

Other international organizations

Many other international organizations have included resilience in their goals.

Since 2021 the World Customs Organization (WCO) has bolstered Recovery, Renewal and Resilience for a sustainable supply chain.

Moreover, on 18 November 2022, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) adopted the Declaration on Building Trust and Reinforcing Democracy (see [OECD Legal Instruments](#)), in the context of the Reinforcing Democracy Initiative, which identifies the main governance challenges facing democracies, including: combating disinformation, enhancing representation and participation in public life, and building **resilience** to foreign influence.

Environmental resilience, especially of the **marine** environment, is addressed in regional agreements to which Spain is a party, such as the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention).

Moreover, within the framework of the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean (Barcelona Convention) (Mediterranean Action Plan [MAP] of the United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP]), the vision of the current 2022-2027 Strategy ([UNEP/MAP Medium-Term Strategy 2022-2027](#)) is to “Progress towards a healthy, clean, sustainable and **climate resilient** Mediterranean Sea and Coast with productive and biologically diverse marine and coastal ecosystems [...]”.

In the sphere of the [Convention on Biological Diversity \(CBD\) of the United Nations](#), to which Spain is a party, special attention has been paid to the **resilience of ecosystems**, as critical to safeguarding ecosystems that provide services essential to well-being and development.

Furthermore, the OCDE has presented the document [Governance at a Glance 2023](#), which includes a chapter on democratic resilience in an era of multiple crises explaining why it is critical that governments invest in democratic **resilience instruments**, specifically to tackle varying levels of risk.

As for the health sector, the World Health Organization (WHO) is revising its International Health Regulations (2005) and drafting a convention, agreement or other international instrument to strengthen pandemic prevention, preparedness and response (WHO CA+) to guarantee globally coordinated preparedness and response capabilities and equitable access to medical countermeasures in future pandemics.



CHAPTER 3

Measures to strengthen resilience to the risks and threats considered in the 2021 National Security Strategy

Chapter 3 of the 2021 National Security Strategy maps out sixteen risks and threats to national security, emphasizing their dynamism and interdependence. The necessary preparedness for these interrelated risks and threats must consider the possibility of several of them materializing at once and the inevitable cascade effects.

To achieve this preparedness, the Spanish Administration has implemented a number of policies and plans featuring resilience as a principal component for tackling crises and ensuring recovery from their impacts.

1. Strategic and regional tension

Conflicts and the strategic situation are monitored on an ongoing basis in accordance with the priorities established in documents such as the National Defence Directive, the Defence Policy Directive and the Intelligence Directive. These priorities are established in the National Security Strategy.

Essentially, the aim is to ensure sufficient knowledge of the situation so as to enable the forecasting of emerging risks, trends and issues—together with their possible implications and opportunities—and the planning of strategic policies and adoption of initiatives for a more resilient future.

2. Terrorism and violent radicalization

In addition to the 2023 National Counter-Terrorism Strategy, at the level of the central administration, the resources allocated to obtaining information are being optimized and linguistic capabilities have been strengthened. Similarly, the number of experts engaged in analysing information and preparing and disseminating intelligence has been increased.

Social inclusion and intercultural dialogue are also being encouraged as strategies for preventing violent radicalization and terrorism. Programmes and measures fostering integration and active participation in society have been adopted with a view to strengthening the resilience of communities and preventing adherence to extremist ideologies. In addition, intercultural dialogue is being promoted as a path to comprehension and understanding between different cultures and religions, and to the prevention of violent radicalization.

Also contributing to this **resilience** is the National Strategic Plan to Prevent and Combat Violent Radicalization (Spanish acronym: PENCRAV). This Plan identifies effective prevention in the sphere of education as being fundamental to interrupting the processes that lead to violent radicalization and recruitment, affirming that “including training and awareness-raising in the educational programme on the risks relating to radicalization is crucial to strengthening social awareness and **resilience** to violent radicalization”.

Similarly, one of the goals set in the sphere of preventive culture is to promote a **culture of resilience**, in line with the Comprehensive National Security Culture Plan.

Providing assistance and support to victims of terrorism is another measure to strengthen resilience. Programmes offering comprehensive assistance and psychological, social and economic support have been established to facilitate victims’ recovery and adaptation, thereby strengthening their capacity for survival and resilience.

3. Epidemics and pandemics

The following three lines of action have been adopted to improve and strengthen Spain's capabilities in terms of analyses, trials and laboratory diagnoses for the rapid detection of zoonosis, animal diseases and pests and plant and forest organisms harmful to human health: investment in the facilities and equipment of the three laboratories attached to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food; construction of a biosafety level 3 laboratory; and construction of a biosafety level 3 large-animal vivarium.

In addition, initiatives have been carried out to strengthen a number of activities relating to the One Health approach, stepping up collaboration and coordination at inter-ministerial level with regard to infectious and/or contagious diseases through different plans and strategic protocols, such as the National Programme for the Prevention, Surveillance and Control of SARS-CoV-2 in American mink farms or the Protocol for the Prevention, Early Detection and Monitoring of Avian Influenza in people exposed to outbreaks of avian influenza.

Considerable investment has been made in the development of measures to prevent animal diseases, including those with zoonotic potential. Different biosafety plans and strategies have been developed in all farming sectors, paying particular attention to those actions or measures entailing a potential risk for the transmission of diseases between animals and humans.

Furthermore, in recent years, contingency plans and action protocols have been put to the test using simulated outbreaks of zoonotic diseases. Representatives from both the central administration and the regional administrations of Spain's Autonomous Communities have collaborated in these simulations.

Efforts are also underway to strengthen epidemiological surveillance through Spain's National Wildlife Health Surveillance Programme and collaboration with the Institute of Research into Hunting Resources (Spanish acronym: IREC), attached to the University of Castilla-La Mancha, to develop a network of health surveillance points for active and passive wildlife disease surveillance and species population monitoring.

In addition, the [Public Health Surveillance Strategy of the National Health System. Responding to the challenges of surveillance in Spain: Modelling the future](#) was developed to achieve the stated objective of Strategic Line 2 of the [2022 Public Health Strategy - Improving the Health and Well-Being of the Population](#), published in August 2022, which is to "update public health surveillance and ensure response capacity to health risks and emergencies."

Furthermore, in the context of the European Union Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) work is underway to implement the [Zaragoza Declaration on Public Health Surveillance](#) of March 2022.

At the legislative level, three Royal Decree bills have been drafted: one to create and regulate a National Public Health Surveillance Network; another to develop a National Plan for Public Health Threat Preparedness and Response with a view to establishing a National Plan for Preparedness and Response to Public Health Emergencies of National Importance (Spanish acronym: ESPIN); and a third to regulate the purposes and functioning of the Communicable Diseases Surveillance System of the National Public Health Surveillance Network. A bill to create a National Public Health Agency and a Royal Decree bill for a Pandemic Preparedness Plan are currently passing through Parliament.

In addition, a Working Group for the Creation of a National Strategic Reserve has been established with the primary aims of identifying the most critical scenarios associated with different types of threats (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) and the mechanisms for recognizing them, and of defining the necessary medical countermeasures to respond to the scenarios identified and the protocols to be followed for each one..

4. Threats to critical infrastructure

The protection of critical infrastructure from possible threats (in the 12 strategic sectors regulated in the Appendix to Act 8/2011 of 28 April, establishing measures for the protection of critical infrastructure), is provided for through the planning instruments of the critical infrastructure protection system, comprising the following action plans:

- The National Plan for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure.
- The Strategic Sectoral Plans, whose minimum content includes global analysis of risks, vulnerabilities and outcomes; proposals for the implementation of the organizational and technical measures necessary to prevent, react to and, where applicable, mitigate, the possible outcomes of the different scenarios considered; proposals for the implementation of other preventive and maintenance measures (for example, drills and simulations, training and instruction of personnel, coordination of the necessary channels of communication, evacuation plans or operating plans to address possible adverse scenarios), and measures for coordination with the National Plan for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure.

The strategic sectors are administration, space, nuclear industry, chemical industry, research facilities, water, energy, health, information and communications technologies (ICT), transport, food and the financial and tax systems.

In the sphere of national defence, the critical infrastructure considered essential to national defence operations has been identified as that attached to the Ministry of Defence and governed by the legislation specific thereto.

To ensure the resilience of critical infrastructure, it is vital not to overlook the importance of prevention, protection, recovery and response measures in relation to cyberthreats. To this end, Royal Decree-Law 12/2018 of 7 September, on the security of networks and information systems, considers a specific range of measures and procedures for all critical operators of essential services.

All this critical infrastructure is supported by organizational structures whose proper design and adequate allocation of human resources are fundamental to guaranteeing the functioning of essential services in crisis situations.

Lastly, it should be mentioned that in response to the need to protect critical infrastructure located outside the territorial waters of Spain's allies but within NATO's area of interest, a Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell with which Spain is in permanent contact has recently been established at NATO Headquarters.

5. Emergencies and disasters

The [General State Plan for Civil Protection Emergencies](#) of December 2020 highlights among the initiatives to be implemented those aimed at “fostering the resilience of the population against emergencies and catastrophes and consolidating a culture of prevention and responsibility”. This is a preventive culture whose purpose is to increase social resilience, as set out in the [Horizon 2035 National Disaster Risk Reduction Plan](#).

Furthermore, an entire body of legislation and planning instruments is being developed to strengthen resilience to the emergencies and catastrophes identified in the Basic Regulations on Civil Protection. These initiatives are supplemented by the drills and simulations being undertaken to prepare for natural and technological risks, as provided for in the National Civil Protection System Act.

In this same sphere, the National Civil Protection Information Network (Spanish acronym: RENAIN) has been created to contribute to the anticipation of risks and facilitate an effective response to situations of all kinds. Efforts are also underway to implement the National Warning Network (Spanish acronym: RAN) and the Mass Public Notification System (“ES-Alert”).

However, in the specific case of marine pollution of any origin or nature that could affect our waters and coasts, with consequent impacts not only for the marine environment, but also for maritime and coastal economic sectors and for critical infrastructure (by obstructing maritime transport, rendering water untreatable for drinking, etc.), other legislation, such as [Royal Decree 1695/2012 of 21 December, approving the National Marine Pollution Response System, is applicable](#).

The National Marine Pollution Response System is based on two subsystems—the maritime and coastal subsystems—whose respective spheres of action are maritime waters and the coast.

The maritime subsystem is covered by the following contingency plans: the National Maritime Plan and the interior maritime plans corresponding to ports, marine terminals, marine platforms and any other maritime facility in Spanish waters. For its part, the coastal subsystem is covered by the [National Plan for the Protection of the Shoreline against Pollution](#), the regional plans of Spain’s Autonomous Communities and the Autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla, and local plans.

Moreover, to strengthen resilience to emergencies, the Standing Committee for Situations of Climate or Environmental Adversity, created by virtue of [Order of the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and the Environment 2272/2013 of 27 November](#), defines among its objectives the centralization, promotion, development, coordination and follow-up of measures adopted in the agricultural, fisheries, forestry and environmental sectors in situations of climate adversity.

In addition, the preamble to [Royal Decree 388/2021 of 1 June, laying down the rules regarding the concession of grants to farmers or economic operators from the fisheries sector or agri-food industries to assist them in obtaining guarantees from the Sociedad Anónima Estatal de Caución Agraria S.M.E. \(SAECA\) for loans to finance their activities](#), refers to the structural need to guarantee the availability of credit to the agri-food sector, including the fisheries sector, to manage the short- and medium-term effects on the sector and on the economy in general of exceptional situations such as the Covid-19 pandemic and extreme weather events.

At a more operational level, the central administration may collaborate with the different regional administrations in situations of serious risk, catastrophe, calamity or other public needs, through a specific entity such as the Military Emergencies Unit, in addition to other civil and military units.

Other examples of sectoral actions can be found in the action protocol in the sphere of aviation applicable to the different stages of a volcanic eruption. The aim of said protocol is to establish the response to crises caused by volcanic ash, enabling the coordination of action between the different bodies involved (the Directorate-General for Civil Aviation; ENAIRE, Spain's main provider of air navigation and aeronautical information services; Aena, the airport services operator; Spain's National Aviation Safety and Security Agency [Spanish acronym: AESA]; the Air Staff; Spain's National Meteorological Agency [Spanish acronym: AEMET]; the National Geological Institute; and the Emergencies, Safety and Crisis Management Unit of the Ministry of Transport, Mobility and the Urban Agenda), as well as coordination with the European and international organizations with which they must interact to guarantee the operational safety of aircraft. A further example of a sectoral initiative is the protocol on surveillance and monitoring actions in the sphere of the transport of radioactive material and management of radiological emergencies, signed between the Nuclear Security Council and the Ministry of Transport, Mobility and Urban Agenda.

Lastly, Spain's law enforcement agencies have also included contingency plans for such emergencies in their security protocols, with the aim of anticipating the criminal activities that could arise in such situations—essentially consisting in crimes against Spain's heritage—and of rolling out the early response measures necessary to maximize effectiveness in fighting crime.

6. Espionage and foreign interference

Counterintelligence and awareness raising activities have been intensified in response to espionage and foreign interference and to adapt to the new ways in which foreign intelligence services are acting against Spain, its interests, its nationals, and its strategic enterprises.

Other developments include the drafting of guidelines and codes of good practice as well as initiatives aimed at raising awareness in different administrative bodies, strategic companies and other groups of activities carried out by hostile foreign intelligence services and of the corresponding risks for Spanish interests.

Also in the sphere of foreign interference, it has been detected that certain foreign governments are using cyberattacks to attempt to influence Western societies and to interfere in specific areas of interest.

Another issue of particular relevance is that of control over foreign investments, which is regulated in Article 7 bis of [Act 19/2003 of 4 July, on the legal framework governing the movement of capital and financial transactions with persons or entities located abroad and on certain measures for the prevention of money laundering](#), in Transitional Provision Two of [Royal Decree-Law 11/2020 of 31 March, adopting additional urgent social and economic measures for tackling the Covid-19 pandemic](#), the Single Transitional Provision of [Royal Decree-Law 34/2020 of 17 November, on urgent measures supporting business solvency and the energy sector, and in the tax sphere](#) and in [Royal Decree 664/1999 of 23 April, on foreign investments](#). All of this legislation stipulates that prior administrative authorization is required in the case of those foreign direct investments in Spain that are considered to entail potential impacts for law and order, public safety and public health.

7. Disinformation campaigns

Spain has a [Procedure for Action against Disinformation, approved by the National Security Council and published by Order of the Presidency of the Government, Parliamentary Relations and Democratic Memory 1030/2020 of 30 October](#). This mechanism facilitates the sharing of information with the Rapid Alert System (RAS) of the European External Action Service (EEAS), to ensure coordinated and joint responses to disinformation campaigns.

It is considered that certain ad hoc disinformation campaigns that take advantage of crises (for example, health crises or acts of aggression between nations) as and when they arise could have serious social repercussions for a country.

This is why Spain undertakes constant monitoring to identify disinformation campaigns of this kind, with a view to anticipating, preventing and/or neutralizing their social permeation and their impact on our country's resilience.

On the one hand, technical monitoring and surveillance work is carried out to detect, issue early warnings and notifications about, and analyse possible campaigns.

In addition, efforts are made to neutralize any false or misleading and potentially harmful information created, presented or disseminated for profit-making purposes or to deliberately deceive the public.

On the other hand, with the aim of fostering public-private collaboration—of the utmost importance in this area—the Forum against Disinformation Campaigns in the sphere of National Security was created in 2022 ([Order of the Ministry of the Presidency of the Government, Parliamentary Relations and Democratic Memory of 541/2022 of 10 June](#)).

This Forum, conceived as a collaborative, advisory body whose decisions would be non-executive and non-binding, was established with the aim of increasing knowledge about the threat of disinformation campaigns, and of analysing and defining possible strategies for tackling them in a comprehensive and coordinated manner, thereby favouring the resilience of society in the face of disinformation campaigns.

In addition, Spain has launched projects and initiatives to foster media and information literacy with respect to disinformation and to increase knowledge about this issue. In this regard, the Royal Decree setting forth the regulations and minimum studies for compulsory secondary education, which entered into force in March 2022, provides for the inclusion of skills to foster media and information literacy and to prevent the risks of manipulation and disinformation on the learning curriculum for 2022-2023.

To advance cybersecurity and the digital trust of citizens and companies, three lines of action—focused, respectively, on awareness raising, media and information literacy, and critical thinking—have been established to increase the resilience capabilities of the public administration as a whole and of civil society against disinformation campaigns.

8. Cyberspace vulnerability

In the sphere of national defence, Spain is undertaking the necessary cybersecurity activities to protect the Comprehensive Defence Information Infrastructure (I3D) and the information assets that are processed, transmitted and stored within it, including the management and operation of the I3D Cybersecurity Operations Centre, the analysis of risks and periodic audits.

Moreover, as regards public safety, Spain is currently developing a Strategic Plan to Combat Cybercrime to supplement the various national and European strategies adopted to date, which share the common and priority objective of making cyberspace a secure environment and of creating a trust-based digital society, thereby favouring **cyberresilience**.

As regards providers of digital services (online marketplaces, online search engines and providers of cloud computing services), [Royal Decree-Law 12/2018 of 7 September, on the security of networks and information systems](#) transposing [Directive \(EU\) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union](#) (NIS 1), and [Royal Decree 43/2021 of 26 January](#), implementing this Royal Decree-Law, lay down a number of security obligations intended to strengthen the resilience of public and private entities by ensuring that the digital services that they use or provide include minimum guarantees of security and protection against cyberattacks or cyberthreats.

Other efforts include those to increase the security of networks and information systems for operators of essential services in the information and communications technologies sector that have not been designated as operators of critical infrastructure. Pursuant to NIS 1, this sector encompasses Internet Exchange Points (IXP), Domain Name System (DNS) providers and top-level domain registries. Oversight of these operators improves the **resilience of public and private entities** by ensuring the integrity, availability and confidentiality of internet services in Spain, reducing the risk of interruptions, loss of data and cyberattacks which could have a negative impact on these organizations and the services they provide to citizens and companies.

Among the plans implementing the second-level strategies of the National Security System, in 2022 the Government approved the National Cybersecurity Plan, with the aim of strengthening Spain's planning, preparedness, detection and response capabilities in cyberspace.

The [2021-2025 Digitalization Plan for Public Administrations](#) was approved for the purpose of making digital services more accessible to the general public and of ensuring a larger number of resources for achieving resilience objectives.

Another area of activity relates to overseeing the application of the [Commission Implementing Regulation \(EU\) 2019/1583 of 25 September 2019 amending Implementing Regulation \(EU\) 2015/1998 laying down detailed measures for the implementation of the common basic standards on aviation security, as regards cybersecurity measures](#), currently in force, in all the

entities subject to the National Civil Aviation Security Programme through the execution of annual inspections plan. In addition, a roadmap is currently being prepared for the application of the [Commission Implementing Regulation \(EU\) 2023/203 of 27 October 2022 laying down rules for the application of Regulation \(EU\) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as regards requirements for the management of information security risks with a potential impact on aviation safety](#), which will enter into force in 2026.

The National Network of Security Operations Centres (SOCs) has been consolidated to strengthen cyberresilience; this is a trail-blazing national and international initiative for collaboration and the sharing of information in real time about cyberthreats.

Moreover, within the cybersecurity governance model, the National Platform for the Notification and Monitoring of Cybersecurity Incidents (Spanish acronym: PNNSC) continues to offer visibility of the level of cybersecurity in Spain to the competent authorities.

9. Maritime space vulnerability

From a public safety perspective, the main threat is still the entry of narcotic substances concealed in shipping containers, primarily from Ibero-America, but also as a result of smuggling and drug trafficking along the Strait of Gibraltar and the Alboran Sea.

This is why, to strengthen **resilience** in the maritime space to organizations engaged in drug trafficking in our waters and along our coasts, initiatives are being adopted in the operational and technological spheres, such as the Tax Agency's Strategic Plan for 2020-2023, the Port Security Plan, the strengthening of maritime intelligence through the use of surveillance and artificial intelligence (AI) systems, and a new air surveillance model.

Furthermore, initiatives focused on resilience are also being considered for inclusion in the Tax Agency's Strategic Plan for 2024-2027.

In the sphere of defence, a number of military operations that will contribute to strengthening **resilience** have been permanently activated.

In the sphere of the merchant navy, inspections are carried out of foreign vessels that dock at Spanish ports as part of Spain's commitment to the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control, to eradicate substandard ships.

Moreover, with the aim of improving safety, in 2022 maritime rescue supervised the transit of 279,173 vessels in traffic separation schemes and in harbour areas.

Resilience is also being strengthened through the definition of policies and strategies for the protection of the maritime space, including those regarding assistance to people affected by incidents. Examples of these are: [Act 14/2014 of 24 July, on Maritime Navigation](#), the international agreements and conventions on maritime safety and protection to which Spain is party—the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea ([SOLAS Convention](#)) and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships ([MARPOL Convention](#))—and other regional and multilateral agreements.

10. Aerospace vulnerability

A number of military operations that contribute to strengthening **resilience** are active at all times, as ordered by national defence authorities.

Resilience is also being reinforced by the definition of airspace protection policies and strategies, which provide for assistance to individuals affected by incidents of this nature. Examples include:

[Act 48/1960 of 21 July, on Air Navigation](#), which lays down the bases and regulations for air navigation in Spain and encompasses airspace safety and protection, air traffic regulation, accident and incident prevention, and aviation emergency management.

The regulations of Spain's National Aviation Safety and Security Agency (Spanish acronym: AESA), which is the body entrusted with regulating and overseeing aviation safety in Spain. It issues specific regulations in different areas, such as operational safety, safety in the transport of dangerous goods by air, and the prevention of illicit acts in aerospace.

Work is underway on the national space threat response architecture and, in the European sphere, the Council of the EU approved the EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence in its [Conclusions of 13 November](#).

Lastly, two simulations are carried out annually to assess preparedness with respect to unlawful interference against civil aviation, in accordance with the airport security instructions of Spain's National Civil Aviation Security Programme (instructions SA2 and SA3).

11. Economic and financial instability

Broadly speaking, resilience in this sector, which is characterized by its cross-cutting nature and multiple impacts on other sectors, requires the identification of external risks to the financial stability of Spain and of its public and private institutions. Without conducting any kind of quantitative analysis of situations involving financial risk or exposure for Spain and its institutions, the aim is to obtain qualified information that—once combined and coordinated with information obtained in other spheres—enables identification of the trends or risks in this sector and the generation of actionable intelligence of use to the national authorities.

At the sectoral level, if we focus on crime linked to corruption and fraud relating to aid and grants, the following actors contribute to strengthening **economic resilience**: the National Antifraud Coordination Service (Spanish acronym: SNCA), as a national contact point of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO), OLAF itself, the State Comptroller's Office (Spanish acronym: IGAE) and law enforcement.

Another action taken was the creation in Spain of the Advisory Council on Preventing and Combating Fraud affecting the European Union's financial interests, a body that is essential to guaranteeing effective cooperation between all those involved in the different phases of the antifraud cycle: prevention, detection, investigation and recovery/sanctions. The National Anti-Fraud Strategy Committee was created in 2022 by decision of the aforementioned Advisory Council.

In the medium term, the fiscal **resilience** of Spain's public sector requires safeguarding the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state, which is essential to maintaining and strengthening the country's social cohesion. As regards Government revenue, this entails adapting the tax system to economic, technological and environmental circumstances, as well as improving effectiveness in preventing and combating tax fraud. With respect to public spending, it entails improving the efficiency, assessment and monitoring thereof, as well as of the budgetary framework and public procurement. The following regulations and planning instruments contribute to strengthening resilience in this sphere:

- [Act 11/2021 of 9 July, on measures for preventing and combating tax fraud](#), which introduces diverse tax measures to facilitate actions for preventing and combating fraud, thereby strengthening compliance checks.
- [The Tax Agency's Strategic Plan for 2020-2023](#), whose strategic goal is to improve voluntary tax compliance through two lines of action: preventing fraud, and combating tax and customs fraud. This Plan shall be succeeded and continued by the Strategic Plan for 2024-2027.
- Legislation on budgetary stability and financial sustainability, including both national ([Organic Law 2/2012 of 27 April, on Tax Stability and Financial Sustainability](#))

and European legislation (which comprises the economic governance framework, above all through the Stability and Growth Pact [SGP] and the European Semester).

- The [Spending Review](#), consisting in a public spending analysis conducted by the Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility (Spanish acronym: AIReF).
- The [2023-2026 National Public Procurement Strategy](#), which establishes measures and actions for achieving legally established goals, such as combating corruption and eradicating irregularities in the application of public procurement law, or fostering economic efficiency in public sector procurement of goods, services and supplies.

Moreover, in October 2021 Europol announced the launch of Operation Sentinel. This operation, created by the European Financial and Economic Crime Centre (EFECC) together with a number of law enforcement agencies, is focused on preventing fraud offences targeting NextGenerationEU recovery funds by gathering intelligence and sharing information across 19 Member States. The agencies involved lend their support to investigations relating to corruption, tax evasion and money laundering.

Specific legislation has been enacted and social protection plans and programmes implemented to strengthen the **resilience of the public and of companies** to economic and financial crises. Some of the main legislative and planning instruments that contribute to strengthening resilience in this sphere are:

- [Act 27/2011 of 1 August, on updating, adapting and modernizing the Social Security System](#). This Act lays down the bases and regulations of Spain's Social Security system, including benefits and services aimed at protecting citizens during economic and financial crises.
- [Royal Decree-Law 11/2020 of 31 March, adopting urgent supplementary measures in the social and economic sphere to tackle the Covid-19 pandemic](#).
- Economic programmes, such as grants, aid and tax incentives aimed at protecting companies in economic and financial crises, fostering employment, and stimulating economic activity.

12. Organized crime and serious crime

The framework for strengthening **resilience** in this sphere is the [National Strategy against Organized Crime and Serious Crime](#).

One of the lines of action for strengthening national resilience to these threats is the European Operational Team (EOT) project, in line with the impetus that the European Commission is giving to the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) and the Internal Security Fund (ISF) thematic facility, as well as a new operational action within the 2022 operational action plan (OAP) on cocaine, cannabis and heroin, which is one of the two OAPs of the EMPACT priority on drug trafficking, and is being led by Spain at EU level.

This trail-blazing project to combat organized crime in the EU has been carried out with the full support of the European Commission's Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, Europol, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL). Its aim is to establish a base of operations on the Costa del Sol for an EOT that will execute a plan prioritizing the investigation of specific individuals suspected of involvement in organized crime and of trafficking drugs between the Iberian Peninsula and the rest of Europe.

Other noteworthy preventive actions include the surveillance of borders and coasts, ports and airports to prevent all types of illicit trafficking, terrorism and irregular immigration.

Efforts to increase and improve the sharing of information between police forces and the gathering of strategic intelligence are also of particular strategic interest in the sphere of prevention.

Considering the transnational nature of organized crime, the development of mechanisms for cooperation, coordination and collaboration between law enforcement agencies and the Customs Surveillance Service, as well as national public bodies such as the Intelligence Centre Against Terrorism and Organized Crime (Spanish acronym: CITCO) and foreign and international police forces, both for the sharing of information and for conducting joint coordinated investigations, including with the participation of European agencies such as Eurojust and Europol, is of particular relevance.

13. Irregular migration flows

The work carried out by the High Level Integrated Border Management Working Group hosted by Frontex, which seeks to define a European integrated border management strategy, with the aim of strengthening our borders and of increasing EU capabilities for adapting to the different scenarios of the migratory challenge, implicitly supports the development of resilience with respect to migration.

Moreover, Spain is participating in updating the Regional Contingency Plan for managing possible mass arrivals of irregular migratory flows to the Western Mediterranean and the Atlantic front (COPLAN-21). The production of COPLAN-21 was supplemented by a digital simulation drill to verify the proper functioning of the Contingency Plan channels of communication when dealing with mass arrivals. This drill was run by the Coordination Centre for the Strait of Gibraltar, the Alboran Sea and adjacent waters (Spanish acronym: CCOE).

The following legislation, planning instruments and actions are aimed at strengthening resilience through policies on the integration of migrants and the protection of their rights, and to foster collaboration with other countries to effectively address the management of migratory flows:

- [Organic Law 4/2000 of 11 January, on rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain and their social integration](#), which establishes the rights and duties of immigrants in Spain, as well as policies on the social, job market and cultural integration and participation of migrants in Spain.
- The 2019-2022 Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration, which seeks to encourage and facilitate the integration of migrants into Spanish society.
- [Royal Decree 220/2022 of 29 March, approving the Regulations governing the international protection reception system](#) which paved the way for the creation of the Reception and Integration of Asylum Seekers Programme.
- Bilateral and multilateral agreements and conventions with other countries for the management of migratory flows and to address issues such as the prevention of irregular migration, the protection of migrants' rights and cooperation in combating human smuggling.
- International development cooperation policies, including measures to address the structural causes of irregular migration, improve living conditions in countries of origin and transit, and promote the socioeconomic integration of migrant communities.
- Participation in Operation Triton and acquisition of material resources with ISF funds to combat irregular immigration.

Spain also participates in dialogues about migration between EU Member States and EU institutions and countries of origin and transit of irregular migration as part of a broad partnership founded on mutual trust.

14. Energy vulnerability

The Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan (Spanish acronym: PNIEC), the +SE Plan (More Energy Security Plan), and the Long-Term Decarbonization Strategy (Spanish acronym: ELP) contribute to reducing energy vulnerability by promoting domestic sources of renewable energy, reducing energy consumption and reconfiguring the energy system.

The PNIEC is the planning tool comprising energy and climate policy. Its energy security approach is based on the following: reducing dependence, in particular, the importation of fossil fuels; diversifying energy and supply sources; increasing preparedness with respect to possible shortages and interruptions of supply; and increasing the flexibility of the energy system. All of this contributes to the development of a resilient energy system that is less vulnerable to climate change and to the vagaries of the energy markets.

In the sphere of research, innovation and competitiveness, the aim is to achieve a safe and resilient electricity system in the context of the energy transition. This will require technological developments with respect to digitalization, power electronics, storage, and improved equipment and materials with a view to consolidating smart grids, increasing the flexibility of assets, managing renewables, and developing distribution infrastructure for gas or petroleum products that is more resilient to extreme events.

An update to the 2023-2030 Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan is currently being drafted. This Plan responds to the commitments established in Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action (Governance Regulation).

Moreover, Lever Policy III: “A fair and inclusive energy transition” of Spain’s Recovery, Transformation and Resilience Plan (Spanish acronym: PRTR) includes a component (Component 8) on electrical infrastructure, promotion of smart grids and the roll-out of flexibility and storage solutions. The principal objective of this Component is to ensure the transformation of the energy system and to guarantee a situation in which Spain is able to rely fundamentally on renewable energies in an energy system that is flexible, robust and resilient.

Moreover, the Long-Term Decarbonization Strategy (Spanish acronym: ELP), approved in November 2020, proposes measures to make the energy system less dependent on fossil fuels. This will decrease the country’s exposure to fluctuations in international markets, thereby increasing its resilience to unfavourable circumstances and its competitiveness at an international level.

The +SE Plan, approved in October 2022, is a response to heightening geopolitical and market tensions and seeks to offer greater energy price security to households and the Spanish economy and to increase the security of supply of the European Union. It contains rapid

impact measures for the winter of 2022/2023, together with measures to contribute to the structural strengthening of that energy security.

In addition, to strengthen strategic and energy autonomy, the Plan commits to reinforcing the energy transition, replacing natural gas and other fossil fuels with renewable energies, as a key line of action in response to the current crisis to increase the resilience of the Spanish and European energy systems to possible supply crises.

The National Energy Storage Strategy, approved in February 2021, analyses storage as one of the key means of increasing the flexibility of the electricity system with a view to supporting the significant growth in renewable generation and contributing to power grid management. The adoption of renewable energies for the decarbonization of the electricity system calls for the roll-out of energy storage solutions to establish a stable system that is resilient to climate variability and changes in the grid. The electricity systems of Spain's islands have unique energy storage requirements due to their energy isolation and low levels of interconnection. This means that the need to incorporate energy storage solutions into these systems to enable a greater integration of renewables into the generation of electricity and thermal energy is even more pressing than on mainland Spain. This situation also represents an opportunity to assess the resilience requirements for the complete decarbonization of the energy system on a reduced scale.

The roadmap for Spain's offshore wind and marine energies, published in December 2021, establishes that to ensure the resilience of the position of Spain and the EU with respect to the foreseen tipping point in the roll-out of floating offshore wind and other marine energies, it is essential to systematize industrial policy on marine energies, identify existing and foreseeable needs in the current context, and harness synergies with the rest of the domestic and EU industrial ecosystem, especially in a context of much-needed economic reactivation.

The renewable hydrogen roadmap was approved in October 2020. The use of green hydrogen in the electricity sector facilitates management of the grid, absorbing excess renewable energy supply. Hydrogen offers considerable advantages to electricity system operators, in terms of both resilience and large-scale flexibility.

As regards the Spanish gas system, by virtue of Act 34/1998 of 7 October, on the hydrocarbons sector (the Hydrocarbons Act), Royal Decree 1716/2004 of 23 July, amended in 2022, regulates the obligation to maintain minimum security stocks and to diversify the storage of natural gas. Also pursuant to the Hydrocarbons Act, Order of the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade 3126/2005 approves the Technical Management Rules of the Gas System (Spanish acronym: NGTS), which cover, among other aspects, the security of supply of the gas system. Specifically, NGTS-11 defines an emergency situation as one in which the use of strategic reserves is necessary and provides that, in said circumstance, the Government will establish the conditions under which they may be used.

Other plans in force include the 2018-2022 Emergency Plan for the Spanish Gas System, published in March 2019 on the website of the Ministry of Ecological Transition and the

Demographic Challenge and the 2018-2022 Preventive Action Plan for the Spanish Gas System, published in March 2019.

These plans were produced in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply, which was amended by Regulation (EU) 2022/1032 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2022 amending Regulations (EU) 2017/1938 and (EC) No 715/2009 with regard to gas storage, and therefore require periodic updating as Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 provides that these plans must be revised and sent to the European Commission every four years.

Therefore, work is underway on their update for the 2023-2026 period and new proposals have already been submitted for consideration.

In this context, the draft Resolution of the Directorate-General for Energy Policy and Mines, amending the winter action plan for the operation of the gas system for the November 2023 - April 2024 period, has been submitted for adoption. This Resolution takes into consideration Regulation (EU) 2022/1032 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2022 amending Regulations (EU) 2017/1938 and (EC) No 715/2009 with regard to gas storage, which established a minimum filling target (currently set at 90%) for Member States, to be achieved by 1 November, for the underground gas storage facilities located on their territories. This Regulation was accompanied by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2301 of 23 November 2022 setting the filling trajectory with intermediary targets for 2023 for each Member State with underground gas storage facilities on its territory and directly interconnected to its market area.

Similarly, as regards safeguarding the electricity supply, Regulation (EU) 2019/941 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector and repealing Directive 2005/89/EC lays down rules for cooperation between Member States for addressing “the risk of an electricity crisis, as a result of natural disasters [...] malicious attacks or fuel shortages”.

In implementation of the aforementioned Regulation, the Directorate-General for Energy Policy and Mines is currently working on a risk-preparedness plan, paying particular attention to the security of supply of energy products used in the production of electricity, principally natural gas, taking into account the current context of international uncertainty in the energy sector.

In addition, to foster savings and improve energy efficiency, special consideration has been given to investments that contribute to efficiency energy in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Strategic Plan since January 2023. Also of relevance are the energy savings and efficiency investments co-financed by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) in rural development programmes (RDPs), as well as productive investments in farms, investments in agro-industries or in basic services infrastructure in rural areas. Another noteworthy initiative is the aid for investment in crop and livestock farms granted in implementation of Component 3 of the PRTR, which provides for specific actions for energy efficiency in buildings, industrial estates and auxiliary facilities.

Specific measures have also been adopted in the fruit and vegetables sector. These include modernizing irrigation systems for greater efficiency, building renewable energy (wind and solar) facilities, adopting more energy-efficient means of production, processing and preparation, generating energy and heat (cogeneration) from waste deriving from the production, processing and preparation of fruit and vegetables for shipment or sale, obtaining biogas from waste, and investing in sustainable irrigation systems (under the Plan for improving the efficiency and sustainability of irrigation).

As regards reducing the use of raw materials for fertilizers, work is underway on the roadmap for defining a strategy to reduce dependence on the use of synthetic or inorganic fertilizers by making use of RENURE (REcovered Nitrogen from manURE) fertilizers.

Lastly, Spain's National Strategy against Energy Poverty was adopted with the aim of strengthening social resilience in this regard and, more specifically, of preventing and combating energy poverty, guaranteeing that citizens—especially the socially vulnerable—have access to sufficient and affordable energy, and promoting energy efficiency and energy diversification measures.

15. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

Spain's Intelligence Services monitor the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and means of delivery (primarily ballistic missiles) programmes of those countries subject to surveillance by international bodies of which Spain is a member. Such surveillance is focused on the materials, technologies and knowledge necessary to undertake such programmes.

Intelligence is also gathered to enable Spain's national authorities to monitor exports of dual-use goods and technologies when international agreements or national laws are violated and said violations involve natural or legal persons that are Spanish or located in Spain, Spain's national territory is used, or Spain's national security or interests are at stake.

In addition, possible disruptive events and the likely outcomes thereof are analysed so as to identify the actors, factors or circumstances that could result in the different scenarios envisaged.

Within the structure of the National Security System, the National Security Council is supported by a Specialist Committee on Non-Proliferation whose duties include those of "strengthening relations with the public administrations engaged in the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and reinforcing coordination, collaboration and cooperation between the public and private sectors" with a view to increasing the resilience of civil society and of public authorities.

Furthermore, the Committee is drafting a National Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction based on the following four pillars: prevention, protection, pursuit and preparedness of resilient responses to minimize outcomes, foster recovery and re-establish normality."

The aforementioned Committee has established an Interception Working Group to serve as an operational body for assessing possible cases of diversion of WMD, their means of delivery and related materials and for ensuring a coordinated response from all the ministries involved and preventing the proliferation of these weapons and materials. To improve the capabilities and mechanisms for combating the proliferation of WMD, this Working Group has proposed a number of legislative amendments, such as those included in the recently enacted Organic Law 14/2022 of 22 December, transposing European Directives and other provisions for the adaptation of criminal legislation to European Union law, and reforming offences against moral integrity, as well as offences involving public disorder and the smuggling of dual-use weapons (including WMD, and their means of delivery and related materials). One of the amendments included in the aforementioned Organic Law refers to Article 65 of the Organic Law on the Judiciary. The amended Article now provides that the National High Court is the judicial body competent to investigate and prosecute offences involving the smuggling of defence and dual-use materials, thus ensuring that this highly complex and technical matter is in the hands of an equally specialist judicial body. A Specialist

Working Group on Proliferation Financing has also been created to develop and promote the measures necessary to comply with the new recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to combat proliferation financing.

At the national level, there are also numerous working groups and committees whose purpose, in part, relates to the ultimate goal of preventing access both of State actors and terrorist groups to WMD. These groups include the Nuclear Affairs Contact Group (Spanish acronym: GCAN), the Contact Group for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons (Spanish acronym: GRUPABI), the Working Group of the National Authority for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (Spanish acronym: ANPAQ), the National Working Group for the implementation of the European Union Action Plan to enhance preparedness against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security risks and, lastly, the 1540 Interministerial Contact Group.

In addition, due to the complexity and sophistication of the money laundering and terrorism financing schemes associated with the purchase of WMD, their means of delivery and related materials, financial Intelligence and risk analyses are conducted, and information is shared at a national level to enable the detection of indications of proliferation financing.

16. Effects of climate change and environmental degradation

One of the main tools in this sphere is the 2021-2030 National Plan for Adaptation to Climate Change (Spanish acronym: PNACC) and its 2021-2025 Working Programme. The 2021-2030 National Plan for Adaptation to Climate Change constitutes the basic planning instrument for fostering coordinated action against the effects of climate change in Spain. One of its objectives is to build a more resilient economy and society.

The PNACC defines 18 areas for action, including: climate and climate scenarios; human health; water and water resources; natural heritage, biodiversity and protected areas; farming, fishing, aquaculture and food; coasts and the marine environment; forests, desertification, hunting and inland fisheries. Other relevant areas include: cities, urban planning and construction; cultural heritage; energy; mobility and transport; industry and services; tourism; the financial system and the insurance sector; disaster risk reduction (DRR); research and innovation; education and society; and peace, security and social cohesion. In addition, the PNACC defines seven cross-cutting aspects to be strengthened in the different areas for action, including the analysis of cross-border impacts.

A Strategy for the Adaptation of the Spanish Coast to Climate Change has also been approved with the general objectives of increasing the resilience of the Spanish coast to climate change and to climate variability, and integrating adaptation to climate change into coastal planning and management.

In addition, the Long-Term Decarbonization Strategy (Spanish acronym: ELP), approved in 2020, proposes measures for reducing the energy system's dependence on fossil fuels and for increasing resilience in the adaptation to climate change. The Strategy also promotes the use of natural carbon sinks, with measures aimed at improving the organic carbon content of agricultural and forest land, which, in addition to increasing CO₂ capture, generates more resilient systems and other benefits relating to food security, biodiversity and water cycle regulation, among others.

Similarly, practices are being advocated in the farming sector to promote greater resilience to the impacts of climate change and, in turn, increase CO₂ fixation by the sector.

Moreover, within the international legislative framework for reducing the greenhouse gas emissions of the maritime sector, Spain has made relevant contributions to the FuelEU Maritime Regulation to prevent the diversion of international maritime traffic to neighbouring ports outside the European Economic Area, such as Tanger-Med, and to reduce the impact on vessels providing transport to and from the EU's islands.

With respect to biodiversity, as recognized in the national Strategic Plan for Natural Heritage and Biodiversity to 2030 (Spanish acronym: PEEPNB), approved by Royal Decree 1057/2022

of 27 December, natural heritage is a fundamental resource for advancing towards a more sustainable, inclusive, innovative and resilient country and society. In fact, one of the objectives of this Plan is to contribute to maintaining the resilience of the natural environment, which enables the different ecosystems to continue providing essential services to citizens, facilitating adaptation to climate change and contributing to its mitigation through carbon fixation and natural disaster risk reduction.

Moreover, the PEEPNB stipulates that in the sphere of disaster risk management, a strategy will be promoted for restoring ecosystems and to favour their resilience and the prevention, reduction and mitigation of disasters resulting from extreme natural events with the potential to affect people, natural heritage and biodiversity. In this regard, an assessment will be conducted to determine the urgency of undertaking river restoration actions, as said actions can provide a response to several key issues in natural disaster risk management, given that, in general, they increase resilience to extreme events (floods and droughts), while at the same time enabling the maintenance and conservation of biodiversity associated with aquatic and riverside ecosystems.

It should also be borne in mind that, in terms of addressing climate and environmental issues, the CAP Strategic Plan for 2023-2027 is the most ambitious so far in the history of the EU due to the commitments adopted in the framework of United Nations Conventions (on Biodiversity and on Climate Change) and the roadmap established in the European Green Deal and the two strategies deriving therefrom, namely the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 and the Farm to Fork Strategy. Spain's Strategic Plan allocates close to 43% of the total budget to achieving climate and environmental objectives. A number of different mechanisms have been adopted to guarantee climate and environmental sustainability, two under Pillar One (enhanced conditionality and eco-schemes) and a third under Pillar Two (agri-environmental measures).

Moreover, from an agricultural point of view, irrigation modernization plans seek to save water and improve efficiency, thus strengthening the resilience of farmers and increasing food security. In a context of climate change, where precipitations are increasingly irregular or even scarce, efficient and sustainable irrigation provides greater stability and safeguards food production.

Initiatives to foster climate change resilience include the following:

- The International Drought Resilience Alliance (IDRA), promoted by Spain and Senegal.
- The Common Implementation Strategy for the Water Framework Directive, whose current Work Plan (for 2022-2024) establishes that climate change must be tackled horizontally. Specifically, the group on water scarcity and droughts and the group on floods deal with themes related to resilience in greater detail.



CHAPTER 4

Other measures to strengthen resilience in the framework of national security

Beyond the risks and threats to National Security considered in the Strategy, there are several sectors whose guaranteed services and operation enhance resilience in the framework of National Security, since, as defined by Act 36/2015 of 28 September, on National Security, they are a “part of the State’s action aimed at protecting citizens’ freedom, rights and well-being”.

Measures to guarantee food and water

The following legislation has been approved to guarantee access to water:

- Royal Legislative Decree 1/2001 of 20 July, approving the consolidated text of the Water Act, which aims to regulate publicly owned bodies of water, water use, and the exercise of the State's powers in this sphere pursuant to article 149 of the Spanish Constitution. Moreover, this Act also seeks to establish the basic rules for the protection of inland waters, coastal waters, and transitional waters, without prejudice to their legal classification and the specific legislation applicable to them. Inland surface water, as well as renewable groundwater, all of which forms part of the water cycle, constitute a single resource, which must be used in the general interest, and is owned by the State.
- Royal Decree 3/2023 of 10 January, establishing the technical and health quality criteria for the supply and monitoring of drinking water, which aims to lay down the technical and health criteria for the supply and distribution of drinking water, from water body to tap, and to establish quality checks, and guarantee and improve access, availability, water safety and cleanliness, in order to protect people's health from the adverse effects caused by pollution of any type.

Food crime and forgery in general remain pervasive in this sphere, which encompasses a broad range of offences that cannot be tackled solely using a policing approach. The scope of these crimes is laid bare in Act 17/2011 of 5 July, on Food Safety and Nutrition, which establishes a basic legal framework applicable to all activities relating to food safety, and to the acquisition of healthy eating and lifestyle habits. This Act, complemented by Act 28/2015 of 30 July, for the defence of food quality, and Royal Decree 1945/1983 of 22 June, regulating breaches and sanctions in matters of consumer protection, alongside EU regulations, establishes a common legal framework for activities included in this sphere.

Moreover, one of the main goals of the 2023-2027 CAP Strategic Plan is to guarantee the supply of food to the population at affordable prices. To this end, the Plan promotes a smart, resistant and diversified agricultural sector which guarantees food safety, environmental care and climate action, contributing to the attainment of the EU's climate and environmental objectives, and the strengthening of the socio-economic tissue of rural areas. These general objectives are broken down into key objectives, five of which are aimed at ensuring the production and supply of food, seeking specifically to:

- guarantee viable farm incomes;
- increase competitiveness;
- rebalance power along the food chain;

- support generational renewal;
- protect food quality and health.

Act 16/2021 of 14 December, amending Act 12/2013 of 2 August, on special measures to improve the functioning of the food chain, and incorporating the provisions of Directive (EU) 2019/633 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain, sets forth an ambitious reform entailing significant improvements for the functioning of business-to-business relationships in the food chain.

Finally, the bill for the prevention of food loss and waste seeks to make the whole production chain more efficient. This will be Spain's first act on the prevention of food loss and waste, and it establishes a set of priority uses for discarded food. The approval of this bill would allow the Government to take a further step in its commitment to fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the UN 2030 Agenda. Target 12.3 of SDG 12 specifically aims to, “[by] 2030, halve per capita global food waste at the retail and consumer levels and reduce food losses along production and supply chains, including post-harvest losses.”.

Measures to guarantee transport

The Strategy for Safe, Sustainable and Connected Mobility 2030 understands mobility as a right, and as a component of social cohesion and of economic growth. It aims to provide solutions to citizens' real mobility problems, and to guarantee an efficient, sustainable and resilient transport and logistics system.

More specifically, resilience in the maritime transport of passengers and goods has been guaranteed by increasing connections between the mainland and other parts of the country. This has been achieved by declaring the lines linking Melilla with Almería, Motril, and Málaga of public interest, and adding stops in Arrecife (Lanzarote), Puerto del Rosario (Fuerteventura), and Santa Cruz de la Palma (La Palma) to the line of public interest that links the Canary Islands to the mainland.

As for the transport of goods, Royal Decree 332/2023 of 3 May, regulating compensation for the maritime and air transport of goods to and from Ceuta and Melilla, has recently come into force. Spain's islands already enjoyed subsidies for this purpose.

Finally, it should be noted that law enforcement agencies are responsible for air and sea transport security and, as air police, for monitoring light and uncrewed aircraft. Moreover, they carry out joint procedures alongside other organizations and bodies for airport security, air transport, and border control in this sphere, and, when necessary, coordinate their implementation and application by different units. Furthermore, law enforcement agencies ensure compliance with Spanish civil aviation's national security programme, which is complemented by its programmes for training in civil aviation security and for quality control of civil aviation security.

Measures to guarantee communications

[Act 11/2022 of 28 June, on Telecommunications](#), regulates telecommunications, including the installation and operation of electronic communication networks, the provision of electronic communication services, associated resources and services, radio equipment and telecommunication devices and equipment, pursuant to article 149.1.21 of the Spanish Constitution. Specifically, this Act is applicable to the public radio domain used by all electronic communication networks, whether public or private, regardless of the service using the network. Pursuant to this Act, telecommunications are services of general interest, and telecommunication services used for national security, national defence, public security, road safety and civil protection purposes are to be considered public services. Moreover, electronic communication service operators are subject to the following categories of public service obligation:

- Universal service obligations, applying to a defined set of services whose provision is guaranteed for all consumers regardless of geographic location, in conditions of technological neutrality, meeting established minimum quality standards, and at an affordable price.
- Other public service obligations, comprising those imposed on operators due to national security, national defence, public security, road safety or civil protection needs, as well as needs related to services concerning individuals' personal safety. Furthermore, the Government may impose additional public service obligations, subject to reports by the Spanish National Markets and Competition Commission and the regional authorities with powers in this sphere. These may relate to:
 - territorial cohesion;
 - the adoption of new technologies, especially in the areas of health, education, welfare and culture;
 - the need to facilitate communication between underserved groups living in special circumstances so as to guarantee adequate supply.

Measures to guarantee the continuity of the functioning of the government and the administration

With regard to national defence, there is a system which allows the continuity of command and control of defence in crisis or emergency situations to be guaranteed.

As for civil protection, efforts are being focused on the first goal of the [Horizon 2035 National Disaster Risk Reduction Plan](#), which is to strengthen the operational management, planning and coordination capabilities of the central bodies of the National Civil Protection System, and to increase coordination of all system operators (at national, Autonomous Community and local levels) in every phase of civil protection.

The continuity of government in the sphere of civil protection is also favoured by the designation of Civil Protection Emergency Management Centres by Spain's different Autonomous Communities and the National Emergency Centres of the Directorate-General for Civil Protection and Emergencies as critical infrastructure, identifying them as bodies that provide essential services to society.

Moreover, the [General National Plan for Emergencies](#) sets out the policies and measures for the management of emergencies at domestic level in Spain, which include information networks and national emergency communications: the National Warning Network (Spanish acronym: RAN), the National Information Network, the National Emergency Communication Network, the National Emergency Communication Network, the National Emergency Digital Radiocommunication Network, the Emergency Radio National Network, the Ministry of Defence's Information and Communication Technologies and Systems Centre's Networks, and the Interconnection of Emergency Centres.

In addition, [Royal Decree 311/2022 of 3 May, regulating the National Security Framework](#), in the sphere of e-government, sets forth the basic principles and minimum requirements necessary for adequate protection of information and services provided by public sector bodies and the systems processing classified information and information systems of private sector entities when providing services or supplying solutions to public sector bodies. Such protection seeks to ensure access, confidentiality, integrity, traceability, authenticity, availability, and conservation of the data, information and services used by electronic means employed by public sector bodies in the exercise of their powers.

Moreover, the aforementioned Royal Decree lists all the response services to security incidents in the public sector. Specifically, Article 26 thereof states: "systems must have security copies, and the mechanisms necessary to guarantee the continuity of operations in the case of loss of habitual means must be established".

Furthermore, the public bodies, agencies, and entities of the financial and tax systems, especially those declared operators of essential services (OES) within the Critical Infrastructure System, have continuity of service plans.

In addition, efforts are underway to identify the functional structure of the General State Administration, on which e-government systems and administrative services are built, in order to strengthen the General State Administration's capacity to respond to the threats identified in the National Security Strategy. To this end, the Administrative Information System and the table of State-only duties are currently being defined. The table defining shared duties was produced in 2017 by the High Committee for the Assessment of Administrative Documents.

In this regard, part of the activity carried out by the National Mint and Stamp Factory is essential to the duties performed by Public Administrations and, in general, to economic activity and the population's activities.

Therefore, the National Mint and Stamp Factory has a Business Continuity Management System which is certified by AENOR and IQNET under Registration Number ES-SCN-2019/0001, which was recently renewed and will be valid until January 2026.

This management system includes a Business Continuity Management Manual, which has proven itself efficient during crises (Covid since 2020, storm Filomena in 2021 or the raw material crisis in 2022), and is a guide for **resilience** in this sphere.

Measures to guarantee the protection of sensitive information

Regulations, instructions, guides and recommendations are continuously drafted and issued in order to guarantee the security of the Administration's information and communications technology systems.

Moreover, the Administration's specialist staff is trained in the security of information and communications technology systems.

In addition, the National Security Office oversees compliance with regulations, both domestic and originating from international agreements or treaties entered into by Spain (in the sphere of NATO, the EU and the European Space Agency [ESA]) and applicable to companies or the administration, and manages personnel security clearance (PSC), which gives access to classified information.

The [Organic Law on Personal Data Protection and Safeguarding of Digital Rights](#) is also relevant for the management of sensitive information. This Act establishes provisions which relate to the protection of personal data and the safeguarding of digital rights in Spain.

Ministries are currently carrying out the preliminary tasks to implement different Information Security Management Systems (IMSS), establishing their operational principles, identifying their organizational structure, and the responsibilities and duties of each component, in order to ensure the access, confidentiality, integrity, traceability, authenticity, availability and conservation of data, information and services supported by information systems and used by electronic means.

In addition, information security policies are being developed within ministries, mainly related to e-government and regulating the protection of classified information.

All of the actions above are being undertaken in accordance with the National Security Framework (Royal Decree 311/2022 of 22 May).

Measures to guarantee the use of critical technologies

The 2020 Defence Policy Directive aims to foster and create a climate of trust in innovation in defence technologies.

The Action Plan against Cybercrime proposes 11 actions, including:

- ACTION No. 5: Comprehensive training of specialists in combating cybercrime.
- ACTION No. 7: Capacity building in digital forensics.
- ACTION No. 10: Creation of a team of specialists in the investigation of the use of cryptocurrency by traffickers.

Finally, the [National Plan for Scientific and Technical Research and Innovation](#) establishes measures to boost scientific research, and technological development and innovation in Spain in different areas, including security and defence.

In this field, and as a measure aiming to increase resilience in the tax sphere, which will have an impact on financial security, the Spanish Tax Agency has created the Task Force to Define and Boost the Execution of the Artificial Intelligence Strategy at the Spanish Tax Agency, through the Tax Agency Director-General's decision of 13 June 2023. The goal of said task force is to define the Artificial Intelligence strategy in the sphere of the Tax Agency, and to promote the identification and development of projects that would benefit from the use of AI at the Tax Agency, ensuring that the use of AI at all times respects the law and the Tax Agency's values.

Measures to guarantee supply chains and minimize strategic dependencies

With regard to National Defence, Armed Forces modernization projects and programmes will contribute to industrial reorganization processes to generate employment, diversify and shorten production chains, guarantee supplies, promote innovation and consolidate Spanish defence industries in the framework of the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB).

Moreover, NATO directives on recommended stock levels are followed.

In the specific area of industry, the following actions stand out:

- Creation of a preparedness and response mechanism for crises in the supply of strategic resources, Strategic Reserve based on National Industrial Production Capacities (Spanish acronym: RECAPI).
- Feasibility study of a proposed European network of strategic reserves based on industrial capacities.

From the point of view of trade, a measure to increase **resilience** and guarantee the supply of essential products is the diversification of suppliers, for which the signing of trade agreements is key, as is the implementation of those treaties already in place. Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) provide an institutional framework which must be exploited, emphasizing supply, especially of certain critical or strategic supplies, and create an appropriate regulatory framework, avoiding the creation of additional uncertainty.

The EU is also supporting initiatives to achieve a reformed multilateral trade system, capable of responding to the challenges of international trade, which would contribute to stabilizing the international economic community. The international situation, given the current challenges, requires greater attention to be paid to the development of the international governance of trade at the World Trade Organization (WTO), the OECD and the Group of 20 (G20), promoting open, predictable and transparent trade relations, and avoiding unjustified restrictions.

The [Road Map for the sustainable management of mineral raw materials](#), approved in August 2022, adapts Spanish planning to the EU Action Plan on Critical Raw Materials, whose aim is to ensure the supply of raw materials to the European economy and which sets out the EU's lines of action regarding materials considered critical for, among others, the energy transition, in order to guarantee **resilience through a secure and sustainable supply** as a crucial contribution to recovery and transformation.

We seek to make the most of this context to boost industrial sectors that guarantee essential resources, promote technological sovereignty, increase the resilience of the Spanish economy and make Spain a strategic actor.

Data and analysis make clear the need to develop **resilient value chains** for industrial ecosystems and reduce dependence on raw materials through a transition that balances the circular use of materials and innovation; the strengthening of sustainable and responsible domestic supply; and the diversification of supply through sustainable and responsible suppliers in third countries.

Another key development is the staple food raw material stock tracking system: the main operators in the market are now obliged to report stocks of rice, cereals, oil crops and certain certified seeds. This information is considered essential to establish the correct actions, as well as to expand knowledge of the market and avoid distortion and speculation. This is especially important in the current context of war. The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food has drawn up a list of “main operators” and the electronic means for reporting the information, and accordingly, the European Commission is receiving this data every month.

Moreover, Act 16/2021 of 14 December, amending Act 12/2013 of 2 August, on measures to improve the functioning of the food chain, not only incorporates the provisions of Directive (EU) 2019/633 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain, it also includes a reform to improve the functioning of trade relations along the chain.

In addition, Spain is part of the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS), alongside G20 members and all the other countries that take part in this initiative, which aims to improve the functioning of the market for staple agricultural products (wheat, corn, soy and rice). This international initiative provides a public information system on the world agricultural market, whose main purpose is to increase market transparency, thereby reducing price volatility. The work carried out by AMIS is structured around five basic, interrelated and mutually supporting pillars:

- Monitoring current trends and future forecasts in international agricultural markets, including the evolution of policies and other market factors, and detecting conditions that require the attention of political decision-makers.
- Analysing current issues affecting international agricultural markets, such as futures markets, energy markets and the fine-tuning of methodologies and indicators supporting said analyses.
- Compiling statistics which bring together the latest and most trustworthy data on production, trade, consumption and stocks of basic products currently covered by AMIS.
- Improving statistical information provided by countries that take part in AMIS by defining best practices and applicable methodologies, and holding technical workshops and training sessions aimed at enhancing domestic capabilities.

- Creating a forum for political dialogue focused on the communication and analysis of market information, guiding and coordinating the action of political decision-makers in managing these markets.

As for **essential information** to ensure the correct functioning of agricultural markets, the National Statistics Plan ([Royal Decree 1110/2020 of 15 December, approving the 2021-2024 National Statistics Plan](#)) and its enabling Annual Programmes define multiple statistical operations referring to different links in the food supply chain. The Plan establishes the essential statistics which must be carried out, guaranteeing their continuity over time.

Royal Decree 427/2022 of 7 June, establishing the operating rules for the National Agrarian Accounting Network, and determining the duties, composition and operating rules of its National Committee, states: “The National Agrarian Accounting Network is an instrument that allows the assessment of farm incomes and the impact of agrarian policy on farms”.

The following actions have been taken to minimize strategic dependencies in the specific area of industry:

- **Legislation:** Bill for the amendment of Act 36/2015 of 28 September, on National Security, specifically Chapter IV, on the RECAPI. Moreover, the draft bill on industry defines strategic industries, linking the catalogue of resources and capacities included in the RECAPI (Chapter IV) through the declaration of Projects of General Interest (Chapter III).
- **Planning and measures:** as part of the technical assistance the EU has provided to the RECAPI in the framework of its Technical Support Instruments initiative, activities are being carried out to minimize dependency and thus improve the resilience of Member States. These include:
 - Design and drafting of a methodology to identify basic and strategic resources for industry depending on the degree of foreign dependence and risk of the country of origin;
 - Design and drafting of a methodology to quantify interventions necessary to mitigate dependence;
 - Drafting of a **Resilience Plan** (Preparedness and Response Plan for Supply Crises in Strategic Resources);
 - Legal aid with recommendations for the drafting of regulations related to the bill (royal decrees and other regulations)..

The European Commission selected the consultancy firm McKinsey & Company to provide technical assistance within an 18-month timeframe (starting January 2023).

From an energy perspective, minimized dependence is being sought in the supply of electricity, natural gas and raw materials, especially mined raw materials. This work is based on a collation of roadmaps that define the milestones to be achieved in different areas, partially included

in the More Energy Security Plan, and initiatives approved under the Strategic Project for Economic Recovery and Transformation for Renewable Energies, Hydrogen and Storage, and the Strategic Project for Economic Recovery and Transformation for the Circular Economy, as well as other strategic projects for economic recovery and transformation, albeit more tangentially.

In addition, in the fertilizer sector, it is vital to maintain the production of European fertilizers as a strategic sector aimed at enhancing food security in the EU. This goal can be reached in two complementary ways: facilitating farmers' access to fertilizers, and guaranteeing the activity of the European manufacturing industry. Spain is exploring both by means of the Roadmap to Guarantee the Supply of Fertilizers, which sets out the priorities and measures relating to the production and use of fertilizers to guarantee food security. It is essential to have agricultural production which supplies the market with varied produce at affordable prices, and to maintain a fertilizer production industry which is less dependent on imports and promotes the circular economy.

Finally, efforts are being made to reduce our dependence on materials such as cereals and protein crops, especially vegetable protein for human and animal consumption. In this respect, research into the improvement of plant species and projects in the framework of the Partnership in Research and Innovation are being encouraged. In addition, a plan has been implemented to provide aid under the CAP to encourage high-protein crops. This aid, which totals €51.2 million for the 2023-2027 period, includes subsidies for legumes for animal feed, for pulses for human consumption and for the production of certified seeds for these crops (which, indirectly, will lead to a greater development of species and varieties adapted to local growing conditions, which will therefore be more **resilient**).

Standing group for the coordination of
national resilience